Iran unlikely to gain nuclear material from Central Asia

ALMATY - Reports that Iran may reach out to Central Asia to replenish its waning uranium reserves sparked concerns last week about how easily the aspiring nuclear power could acquire nuclear materials.

But with treaties in place, a reliance on Western relations and increased oversight, several experts said they believe it would be extremely difficult for Iran to make a deal — overtly or covertly — without some knowledge on the part of nuclear security officials.

The Associated Press (AP) reported December 30 that Iran’s burgeoning nuclear programme had run low on uranium ore, leading officials there to hold secret talks with “elements” in Kazakhstan to secretly purchase 1,350 tonnes of processed uranium.

Iran and Kazakhstan — the world’s largest uranium producer last year — immediately denied the reports, which were based on an intelligence report from an unnamed International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) member country.

But Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova, a research associate with the Centre for Nonproliferation Studies in Monterey, California, said current international law prevents any sort of deal between Iran and Central Asia. “Strictly speaking, Iran cannot turn to any of the Central Asian nations at this point. Under the terms of the Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (CANWFZ) Treaty, none of its member states — and that’s all five of the CA republics — can export nuclear material to a country that does not have in force the Additional Protocols (issued by the IAEA to improve nuclear security). Iran signed the AP in December 2003, but has not yet ratified it, so it does not meet the conditions of supply under CANWFZ”, she said in an e-mail to Central Asia Online.

Shamil Yenikeev, a leading political expert on Central Asia at Oxford University, added that a deal by Kazakhstan with Iran could be a huge blow to Kazakh foreign policy in the region.

“Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Kazakhstan’s leadership has always pursued a well-calculated foreign policy in relations with its neighbours (including Russia and China as well as Caspian and Central Asian countries) and major external players”, he said.

Yenikeev added that it would not just have regional implications, but wide-reaching effects on Iran and Kazakhstan as they strive to grow as regional and global powers.

“A uranium deal between Kazakhstan and Iran will not only violate the UN Security Council sanctions against Iran but will also undermine Kazakhstan’s credibility as the 2010 OSCE Chair”, he said.

Togzhan Kassenova, Senior Research Associate for the Centre for International Trade and Security at the University of Georgia, agreed.

“There are no grounds to believe that Kazakhstan would ever consider making any kind of deal in violation of international non-proliferation norms and UN Security Council resolutions, with Iran or any other country”, she said. “Kazakhstan has a laudable non-proliferation track record. The country got rid of more than a thousand nuclear weapons present on its territory at the time of the Soviet collapse”.

Kassenova added that any deal with Iran would likely have an economic toll for Kazakhstan, which produced about 14,000 tonnes of uranium in 2009, to become the world’s largest producer of the material. A secretive deal with Iran could hurt its ability to remain the largest producer.

“It is highly unlikely the government of Kazakhstan or the management of the state-owned uranium production company Kazatomprom would be interested in pursuing any deals that would undermine the country’s political or commercial reputation”, she said.

Mukhatzhanova conceded that those regulations apply “if we are talking about legally concluded, open deals”, but added that she believes even smuggling uranium would not be feasible.

“I personally believe that one official ‘going rogue’ is not enough - there are different elements and stages involved, starting with taking the material from the mining and milling site, to transportation and passing the customs”, she said.

While Kazakhstan has a large quantity of enriched uranium from the Soviet era, that material has been deemed a high enough risk that security has been upgraded to included IAEA supervision.

Mukhatzhanova said security of natural uranium mines is not as strict, but so much of the material would be needed that any smuggling operation would require so many people that the suspicions of government or foreign officials would be raised.

“It would be quite hard for an individual or a small group, without involvement or assistance from governmental agencies or officials, to smuggle such a large quantity for it to truly make a difference”, she said. “I don't believe that the government would sanction such a sale, considering political costs involved and the fact that Kazakhstan has by now gained some experience with export controls. I should hope that people working at Kazatomprom and in the Ministry of Energy are competent in these areas”.

Kassenova agreed that a secret deal or an attempt to move the material secretly is unlikely.

“The suggestion that the alleged deal was negotiated outside of ‘official channels’ appears unsubstantiated because it involved more than a tonne of purified uranium ore, not some simple transaction of regular commodities”, she said.

But Kazakhstan may not be the only country with Uranium being wooed by Iran. Central Asia Online reported January 4 that Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s visit to Tajikistan — which was a major source of uranium for the Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons and power programmes — raised questions as to whether Iran could potentially reach out to Tajik President Emomali Rakhmon for help.

Rakhmon has repeatedly expressed support for Iran’s peaceful nuclear power program.

But, Mukhatzhanova said, Tajik uranium reserves are all but wiped out, despite Rakhmon’s assertion in a 2008 speech that the nation still had 13 percent of the world’s reserves.

“Tajikistan does not have its own uranium reserves, and the combine (Vostokredmet) that used to produce yellowcake from imported uranium is now more focused on processing precious metals”, she said.

According to a report by the non-proliferation think tank Nuclear Threat Initiative, Vostokredmet, which processed up to one million tonnes of uranium ore per year for the Soviets, processes only a small amount of uranium now. Several Chinese and Russian companies had discussed deals in the late 1990s and early 2000s to process uranium at the combine, but so far none have come to fruition, the NTI report said.